Pioneers Insight Method Research Author
$DRVN Cruising through the Driven Brands thesis | Kyle Mowery GrizzlyRock Capital
Back to Episodes

$DRVN Cruising through the Driven Brands thesis | Kyle Mowery GrizzlyRock Capital

Summary

  • Kyle Mowery’s original $DRVN car-wash catalyst hit — both U.S. and international car wash were divested and closed — yet the stock sits around $13 after moving from $14 to $19 and then falling to $10 on an accounting restatement. The thesis is unchanged: Take 5 quick lube is “the crown jewel” and the whole ballgame, and the setup is “cheap, it’s growing, and it has cash flow, and it’s catalytic — pun intended.”
  • The valuation anchor is Valvoline: similar returns on capital and growth profile, trading at 11x this year’s EBITDA while Driven trades at 8x. Walker notes Valvoline’s recalled 8.2% same-store sales versus Take 5’s 4%; Mowery concedes Take 5 might merit a lower multiple but argues, “I don’t disagree, but Driven’s trading at eight, not nine” — the discount reflects leverage and the “three strikes” of car wash, a CFO-related issue, and the restatement.
  • Both agree the February 25 restatement 8-K reads scarier than it is: of four error categories, “three were innocuous. One was spicy” — the cash adjustments. But those cash errors originate “primarily in fiscal 2023 and earlier,” the CFO and auditor didn’t resign, and subsequent filings (April 21 preliminary results; a May 8 NT 10-Q citing $1–5M of 2025 restatement impacts) have, in both speakers’ view, reduced the left-tail risk. Separately, the company said Q1 2025 revenue would fall by $1–5M.
  • Andrew Walker’s sum-of-the-parts: ~$400M Take 5 EBITDA at 11x covers all debt plus the share price up to $17, so franchise brands ($180M trailing EBITDA), auto glass ($20M), and corporate costs (-$150–170M) come roughly free. Mowery argues public markets may underestimate the private-market value of the capital-light franchise stream, citing Jiffy Lube’s reported 8–9x private-sale multiple while noting that benchmark was not for a franchise system.
  • The honest bear case: no adjusted EBITDA guide in the April update from a company known for add-backs (roughly $120–180M on ~$500M EBITDA), and corporate expense drifted from 20% to 24–25% of revenue — 400–500bps, roughly $100M, “unexplained.” Walker concedes the counters are fairly weak until the numbers arrive; he calls corporate-cost growth his biggest question, while Mowery also flags the expense load as a major issue.
  • The event path runs through Roark’s ~65% stake, held in 10- and 14-year-old fund vintages, with a May 8 report saying Inspire Brands may IPO in the back half of the year. Mowery’s speculation: “Roark probably wants out more than they want back in” — a process for all or part of the business could surface such that “we will know by Labor Day or at least Halloween,” underwriting “a pretty straightforward way to make 50% plus over the next 12 to 18 months.”
  • EV risk stays defused: over 90% of U.S. cars sold are still ICE, the car parc averages over a decade old, and Walker says PE-style franchise operators now put the ICE-fleet peak at 2035–37, perhaps later — with 15 more years of servicing behind it. Broad franchisee checks, from real-estate hobbyists to PE shops opening 20–40 boxes, confirm strong cash-on-cash returns and appetite for more units.

Deep dive

1. The car wash exit happened — just cheaper than modeled

  • Two-and-a-half years after the first pod (stock in the $14s), the core catalyst materialized: both U.S. and international car wash were divested and closed, narrowing Driven to “high-margin recurring franchise revenue and Take 5, which is the crown jewel.” Mowery is still long; Walker discloses “a pretty decent-sized long position.”
  • Walker’s opening worry: the exit multiples — roughly 8x U.S. and 7x international by Walker’s estimate, which Mowery thought might be lower — “came in pretty low,” raising the uncomfortable question of whether being “a turn or two off” on the low-quality assets means being off on the crown jewel too.
  • Walker’s explanation, framed through Capital Returns, is that U.S. car wash “became oversupplied in a dramatic way,” Driven’s locations weren’t great, and “in an oversupplied market, the price was low” — lower than his published 2024 deck. Walker thinks the company wanted out of businesses tied to weather, simplify, and “just start over from a car wash perspective.”

2. Take 5 is the crown jewel, and Valvoline is the anchor

  • The business as Mowery describes it: a two-bay, stay-in-your-car quick lube — “cheap, it’s friendly, it’s efficient” — born in Metairie, Louisiana (Walker’s hometown), now nearly 1,300 locations nationally with a stated path to 2,500 and very strong four-wall economics whether corporate or franchisee capital funds the box.
  • The public comp does the heavy lifting: Valvoline has “very similar returns on capital and that business trades at 11 times” this year’s EBITDA. Walker’s corollary — “if you don’t believe Take 5 is worth low-double-digit multiples… one of them can’t be correct.”
  • Walker’s skeptic case: he recalled Valvoline reporting 8.2% same-store sales (two-thirds price) versus Take 5’s preliminary 4%, so maybe Take 5 deserves nine, not eleven. Mowery doesn’t fight the lower-multiple possibility: “I don’t disagree, but Driven’s trading at eight, not nine” — no multiple risk taken, and the gap reflects leverage plus “three strikes and you’re out”: car wash, a CFO-related issue, and now the restatement.

3. The EV question keeps getting pushed to the right

  • Mowery’s data: over 90% of U.S. cars sold in 2025 are still ICE-powered, the car parc averages over a decade old, and his 2024 cohort analysis projected the ICE fleet peaking in 2032–33 — “we’re not seeing any data that would suggest that has changed.” That implies a 20-year life cycle per unit.
  • Walker’s franchisee checks push further out: PE-style operators opening 20–40 boxes now say the ICE peak is “2035 to 2037, maybe later,” with “another 15 years of servicing behind it” — plus tailwinds from premiumization, synthetic oil, and share taken from legacy mechanics. “We’re all dead in the long run.”
  • The confirming tell for both: units growing double digits across franchisee and corporate units at Driven and Valvoline — “multiple different types of investors put their capital to work in the industry.”

4. Restatement anatomy: “three were innocuous. One was spicy”

  • Walker’s core read of the February 25 8-K: most of the cited issues relate to fiscal 2024 and earlier, aside from the ATI item identified as occurring in fiscal 2025. He speculates that an Oracle ERP he believes was implemented in July 2024, a new CFO he recalls arriving around October 2024, and the car-wash disposals may have surfaced old-ERP issues or made previously immaterial items material.
  • Line by line, both wave through lease/right-of-use adjustments and expense classification — the latter a relic of the 2021 IPO-era “platform” build-out where, as Mowery puts it, “if you got three accountants in a room, you might get two or three different answers.”
  • Cash adjustments are the one that gave both heartburn — “cash should be the one thing that’s readily accountable” — but Walker highlights the filing’s own language: errors “primarily originating in fiscal years 2023 and earlier.” He therefore thinks the 2024–25 balances may be trustworthy, though that remains dependent on the eventual numbers. Mowery’s test is magnitude: $5M would be “a wonderful sigh of relief”; a giant number and “I guess we’ll be wrong.”
  • The only item Walker identifies as really being in FY25 is inappropriately recognized ATI revenue, from a franchisee-training business. The company later said Q1 2025 revenue would be reduced by $1–5M; Walker estimated that implied less than $1M of quarterly gross profit and argued, “It’s not going to impact the value.”

5. Subsequent filings clipped the left tail; June is a “foot fault” call

  • Two developments since February: the April 21 8-K with preliminary unaudited 2025 and Q1 2026 results, and the May 8 NT 10-Q citing $1–5M of 2025 restatement impacts. Mowery’s frame: “the lawyers are in charge here… the lawyers are not going to let numbers leave that aren’t buttoned up at this point.”
  • His evidence for modest magnitude: no CFO resignation, no auditor resignation, and the company re-segmented and put out data two weeks before pulling the 10-K — “if it was huge, they would have known about it two weeks before they pulled the plug.”
  • On the mid-June 10-K deadline bears call unrealistic, Mowery’s hedge is explicit: “The simple answer is I don’t know… It could be anything” — but his sense is this “just barely is a foot fault,” not “driving right over the line and leaving bodies in the wake.” Walker’s fallback: buying below Take 5’s standalone value, “why do I care if it’s June or September?” — though he admits the market won’t be happy with a slip.
  • Both largely reject the far-left tail of outright fraud: swipe-a-card, $50, ten-minute oil changes aren’t percentage-of-completion accounting, franchisee checks confirm the business, and Roark built and IPO’d this itself. Mowery: “I don’t believe there’s a reasonable possibility that that’s an out-and-out fraud.”

6. The bear case that lands: silence on EBITDA and a ballooning corporate line

  • Mowery’s “dog that didn’t bark”: a company that bears associate with roughly $500M of EBITDA and roughly $120M–$180M of add-backs suddenly couldn’t produce an adjusted EBITDA figure or guidance in April. Bears read that as fundamentals deteriorating; Walker concedes the counters are fairly weak until the numbers arrive.
  • Corporate expense is Walker’s biggest question: SG&A ran ~20% of revenue for years (matching Valvoline) but drifted to 24–25% — “400 to 500 basis points of SG&A that is unexplained,” roughly $100M on ~$2B of revenue. Walker says Roark has more line-item information than minority holders, while public investors have “the advantage of liquidity… and price. To get in, get out.”
  • On the weaker sister brands (flat same-store sales, stalled unit growth): Mowery notes Maaco’s core customer sits on the low end of the K-shaped economy and took a tariff-driven Q2 2025 hiccup, but Driven isn’t trying to grow those units, just maintain them — and Jiffy Lube’s private sale at a reported 8–9x was not a capital-light franchise-system benchmark.

7. Sum of the parts: Take 5 covers $17, the rest is free

  • Walker’s stress-tested math, built when the stock was $11–12: ~$400M Take 5 EBITDA at 11x “covers all of the debt and covers the share price up to $17 per share,” with franchise brands ($180M trailing EBITDA), auto glass ($20M), and corporate (-$150–170M plus add-backs) treated as “a wash.” And unlike his usual cigar butts, “Take 5 will grow in value” — worth $20/share a year out even if nothing else resolves.
  • His side observation on mix: with roughly 780 corporate versus 500 franchised Take 5 boxes, one corporate store is worth perhaps 10 franchise stores to the company — “the corporate stores is where all the value is.”
  • Mowery’s amendment: public markets underestimate franchise brands because “there’s no growth and we’re in a market that focuses on growth and momentum” — Meineke and Maaco date to 1972 and their financials are “rock-solid steady,” unlike faddish franchise streams such as his CrossFit contrast. He won’t compress that multiple “much below 10.”
  • On auto glass — where Mowery admits “I was overly bullish… in my original write-up” — the business is “delayed, not dead”: a national number two to Safelite assembled from 13 regional players on one operating system, with a national contract potentially making it “Take 5 2.0.” Mowery says it may account for a large part of corporate costs; it is his second question for management.

8. Roark’s endgame: “wants out more than they want back in”

  • The caveated speculation — Mowery has never spoken to Roark about Inspire or Driven — is that there are two paths. Path one: stay public, simplify, delever — but “investors have long memories and nobody wants to get burned by buying Driven,” so the stock only “wanders into the low 20s” over a couple of years. Path two, the catalytic one: Roark runs a process for the whole business or for franchise brands — undisclosed until done, exactly as with car wash — and “we will know by Labor Day or at least Halloween.”
  • Mowery’s fund-vintage logic points him toward an exit: Roark holds its ~65% in vintages 10 and 14 years old. He says a newer-vintage fund might reach into its pocket to buy out minority holders and take the company private, whereas the age of these funds makes that less likely.
  • Walker adds the timing tell — a May 8 report said Inspire Brands, Roark’s largest investment by far, may IPO in the back half of the year: “does Roark really want this dog of an accounting restatement out there?”
  • Mowery’s bottom line: “a pretty straightforward way to make 50% plus over the next 12 to 18 months.” Walker knows bulls holding for $25 and $35 — “I’ll take either” — and notes even the public-company path, with Take 5 plus auto glass at 3x leverage, returning capital, and perhaps bolt-ons like Valvoline’s “Grease” deal, could earn a strong multiple.

9. Coda: capital cycles everywhere you look

  • Mowery’s current work: housing (long Olin — chlor-alkali and downstream products are “wildly interesting” in relation to housing and general industrial production) but little capital deployed because housing stocks are “functionally a macro play” on the 10-year; senior living “is a home run because the demographics are so strong,” name-checking Sonida as “a wonderful business run by an exemplary capital allocator” — though “I’m not long. I should be long.”
  • Walker’s memory-stock riff: stocks trading “like they make 50% ROEs forever” invite a fourth player; Mowery’s warning is China — increased Chinese supply “has destroyed so much value” in Western industrial production over 5–8 years, so anyone in memory “needs to study what could be produced in China very, very closely. But as of now, shortages and prices are up.”