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Episode 202 - November 6, 2026

·Biotech Hangout

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Topics Biotech Investing and Clinical Catalysts
Pioneers Brian Skorney Adam Feuerstein Paul Matteis Yaron Werber

Summary

  • The panel split over whether the Democratic sweep improves biotech’s foundations or increases near-term pricing risk. With XBI down 3% for the week versus roughly 2.5% for the S&P, Matteis saw “more downside risk” from potential Trump–Democrat cooperation on drug prices. Skorney leaned net positive on access and investment, Feuerstein expected legislative inertia, and Werber argued that rates and broader market weakness could matter more than healthcare legislation.
  • Vertex’s expected IgAN approval would open a commercial fight harder than the regulatory decision. The November 30 PDUFA date brings questions about undisclosed treatment interruptions and possible IgG monitoring, although the panel generally doubted Vertex would receive a uniquely restrictive label. Skorney emphasized the larger disadvantage: competitors have kidney-function outcomes while Vertex could spend roughly two years selling proteinuria data—“there’s a big difference between kidney outcomes and a biomarker.”
  • Revolution Medicines’ $198 million opening print beat expectations without resolving the valuation debate. Five weeks of pancreatic-cancer sales exceeded buy-side whispers of $80–100 million, helped by expanded-access patients and pent-up demand. The bear case concerns a possible plateau before label expansion and a valuation where “execution has to be perfect.”
  • The Vykat XR and Madrigal controversies turn on causality, with different evidence behind their safety overhangs. Feuerstein reported eight deaths and more than 100 hospitalizations among patients prescribed Vykat XR; underlying Prader–Willi complications overlap with recognized drug risks. Madrigal faces unproven whistleblower allegations, countered by its account of roughly 56,000 treated patients without an evident liver-toxicity signal. The panel stressed how difficult “disproving a negative” becomes after commercialization.
  • A reported nonprofit psilocybin filing could threaten Compass’s pricing before COMP360 reaches market. Matteis questioned how a competitor with unpublished Phase 3 results and less disclosed evidence could already have filed an NDA. A cheap alternative might invite payer pressure, but REMS, specialty distribution and supervised treatment could preserve separate channels: “these clinics need to be able to make money.”
  • Zolgensma tumor reports reinforced Matteis’s caution about AAV beyond severe rare diseases. A couple of reported cases showed vector integration, making a theoretical carcinogenicity concern more tangible, although he still viewed the benefit–risk balance in severe SMA favorably. His broader warning was “develop elsewhere at your own peril”; Werber counterbalanced that caution with Ultragenyx’s new rare-disease approvals.
  • Pelacarsen’s failed study challenges the Lp(a) thesis in patients whose other cardiovascular risks are already controlled. Werber wanted the AHA presentation the following morning to reveal whether subgroups retain benefit or development should shift toward primary prevention. Amgen might alter its studies, but the implications remained “very much TBD.”
  • The next pipeline tests concern symptoms, durability and safety as much as initial efficacy. Werber was “fairly optimistic” about Amgen’s year-end symptomatic Sjögren’s readout. BeOne’s BTK-degrader filing now looked more likely around the middle of next year because of additional durability follow-up, described as unrelated to safety. In CAR-T, Gilead’s December 23 PDUFA date approaches while Legend reported steroid prophylaxis reducing parkinsonian risk from roughly 4–6% to 1.25%.

Deep dive

1. The election creates competing pricing and institutional bets

  • Against XBI down 3% for the week and the S&P roughly 2.5%, Skorney described a “blue tsunami”: seven Senate flips and 42 House flips. He framed the election’s macro stakes around fiscal policy, interest rates and cost of capital: rate changes can materially affect NPV in long-cycle biotech, while cash-generative pharma may be affected differently from development-stage companies. Werber argued macro could matter more than drug pricing; AI regulation and broader market weakness could spill into biotech. His conditional bull case was that slower rate increases, compared with the previous cycle’s abrupt slope, might leave biotech more insulated.
  • Skorney noted that newly elected officials had campaigned to reverse cuts to ACA subsidies, Medicaid, NIH, CDC and FDA funding. Matteis separated institutional repair from stock performance. Restoring HHS credibility and FDA consistency could help over time, but drug pricing looked like a plausible area for Trump–Democrat compromise. MFN and tariff discussion had produced little consequence while specialty launches achieved unexpectedly high prices. His near-term conclusion was “more downside risk”; Feuerstein suggested manufacturers stop trying to set record prices with every approval.
  • Feuerstein’s cynical baseline was that Washington would generate headlines without accomplishing much: “this is D.C.” Skorney disagreed on the net outcome. He said many Democrats who won in red states were left of center, elected by right-of-center voters frustrated with Trump policy; he thought collaboration could free up access and new investment without catastrophic sector consequences. He nevertheless expected considerable noise around Medicare for All and aggressive pricing proposals.
  • FDA succession remained unresolved. Skorney praised acting commissioner Kyle Diamantas, while several hosts doubted Heidi Overton’s confirmation prospects. Matteis questioned whether outgoing senators would prioritize confirmation during the remaining session. Fewer controversies felt stabilizing, but the panel wanted a longer record of regulatory decisions before declaring consistency restored; one disputed application would not establish that by itself.

2. Vertex’s IgAN debate separates approval from long-term competitiveness

  • Feuerstein introduced Vertex’s candidate, povetacicept, called “POV” throughout the discussion: a November 30 PDUFA date with “very little doubt” about approval. An anonymous client’s citizen petition sought immunoglobulin monitoring after identifying protocol provisions for treatment interruptions when IgG fell below a threshold. Vertex declined to disclose how many patients interrupted treatment, emphasizing similar infection rates between treatment and control.
  • Skorney called B-cell modulation a potential “miracle treatment.” He cited Otsuka’s essentially flat mean eGFR trajectory, what he recalled as roughly a 98% reduction in composite kidney outcomes, and zero transplants versus, he thought, five on placebo. But protective IgG also falls. A short trial, particularly with treatment interruptions, cannot establish the infection consequences of deeper suppression across what he called “a 20-year disease.”
  • On labeling, Skorney argued, “you do it for the class or you don’t do it for the class.” Otsuka and Vera also monitor immunoglobulins in trials without corresponding label requirements. One panelist’s gut favored no additional monitoring requirement, while acknowledging uncertainty. Skorney found Vertex management’s repeated confidence in a comparable label persuasive, even while criticizing its refusal to answer the interruption question.
  • The bigger commercial issue was arriving third with less follow-up. Skorney expected Vertex to lack kidney-function outcomes for roughly two years while rivals moved to full approvals; proteinuria remains a biomarker. A panelist pointed to poor commercial performance in pain and Casgevy in sickle cell as a caution about Vertex’s execution. Looking further ahead, Skorney favored selective Gd-IgA1 approaches at Biohaven and Argenx that, in his framing, could avoid depleting protective IgG.

3. Revolution’s opening sales reset expectations faster than valuation

  • Feuerstein set the scene with buy-side whispers of $80–100 million for Revolution Medicines’ first five weeks of pancreatic-cancer sales. The first reported print was $198 million, far above expectations. Panelists described a potentially exceptional oncology launch, while noting that expanded-access patients and pent-up demand boosted the opening period. Those tailwinds would not recur in the same way in Q4.
  • Matteis outlined the bear question: could sales flatten within three quarters, leaving a wait for frontline or other indication expansions? His historical comparisons—Alumis and Insmed—concerned buy-side estimates outrunning published consensus until “the beats aren’t enough.” He explicitly allowed that Revolution could still be “a total monster.” Werber’s valuation framing was less forgiving: an expensive stock means “execution has to be perfect.”

4. Vykat XR’s safety reports reopen the benefit–risk argument

  • Feuerstein reported eight deaths and well over 100 hospitalizations among patients prescribed Soleno-originated Vykat XR, now marketed by Neurocrine. He obtained case reports for seven deaths and described hypoglycemia and edema among the circumstances. Attribution is difficult: Prader–Willi syndrome itself carries serious complications, while swelling is also a recognized, labeled drug risk.
  • Skorney emphasized that efficacy had not been a conventional “knock it out of the park” result: approval followed a randomized-withdrawal study after an unsuccessful primary analysis. That complicates accepting serious potential harms. He also thought Neurocrine’s stock damage had exceeded what it paid for Soleno, leaving the narrower investment question of whether the acquisition could generate meaningful cash flow.
  • One panelist found Neurocrine’s CMO “super credible” and interpreted her comments as confidence that the existing label adequately described risk, alongside a planned high-risk-patient study. Feuerstein pushed back: that sounded like “talking out of both sides.” He wondered whether the study could identify patients for whom treatment was unsuitable, analogous to separating ambulatory and nonambulatory populations in Duchenne treatment decisions.

5. Madrigal’s lawsuit alleges a signal that physicians have not described

  • Feuerstein described a former Madrigal executive’s whistleblower lawsuit alleging that management suppressed investigation of liver-injury concerns in trials and postmarketing surveillance. The plaintiff alleged demotion and a forced resignation after raising those concerns. These remained allegations; Madrigal had not formally answered the complaint and said it would defend itself vigorously.
  • The company’s argument, cited by a panelist, was substantial exposure: about four years since approval and roughly 56,000 MASH patients prescribed Rezdiffra without an evident drug-induced liver-injury problem. Another panelist relayed that investors who regularly spoke with MASH physicians had not heard reports of toxicity resembling the allegations. That was presented as persuasive, while the lawsuit’s merits remained unresolved.
  • A panelist struggled to see a clear route from the allegations to a material change for an established drug. Another explained the attribution problem: progressive liver disease itself produces cirrhosis, transplantation and deterioration, making ordinary liver-injury assessment difficult without controls. The discussion allowed that liver toxicity was probably unlikely given exposure, but stressed that “disproving a negative” in commercial practice is hard.

6. A nonprofit filing complicates Compass’s commercial assumptions

  • Matteis described a surprise report that the Usona Institute had completed a psilocybin NDA. Its Phase 3 had finished about a year earlier without public results; even whether it technically succeeded remained unclear. Compass’s COMP360, developed for treatment-resistant depression rather than broader major depression, was nearing submission with a commissioner’s voucher and potentially only months from approval.
  • The regulatory puzzle was evidence. Matteis had expected the nonprofit to need a second Phase 3 and said Compass had spoken to investigators who did not know the results. He also noted that CDER’s head previously worked at Usona. He explicitly did not know whether that official had recused himself or whether the connection had any bearing on the filing.
  • Commercially, cheap nonprofit psilocybin could invite payers to require its use first. But REMS, specialty pharmacies and supervised clinic sessions create costs: “these clinics need to be able to make money.” Matteis could envision distinct channels, perhaps nonprofit access through the VA while Compass served specialty interventional clinics. The operating complexity historically cited against psychedelics might therefore protect part of Compass’s model.
  • A panelist questioned how expensive regulated products coexist with increasingly available mushrooms, citing cannabinoid and ketamine precedents. Matteis’s answer was that serious illness favors reliable composition, professional administration and managed interactions. He expected a branded, controlled-setting market despite recreational availability. Another panelist thought the nonprofit development would probably have little impact on different modalities such as LSD or 5-MeO-DMT.

7. Zolgensma’s reports sharpen the boundary for gene therapy

  • Matteis discussed a handful of postmarketing tumor reports after Zolgensma, including a couple with evidence of vector integration. He did not vouch for every media or parent claim, and did not say the risk was unchanged. Severe type 1/2 SMA still made the treatment’s benefit–risk balance look favorable to him, although alternatives matter. Spinraza’s resilience despite intrathecal administration, oral competition and one-time gene therapy was, he argued, unusually revealing about physician and patient confidence.
  • His broader conclusion was that AAV currently “feels like it’s a rare disease modality,” especially where alternatives are good or disease severity is lower. He also cited other postmarketing gene-therapy safety issues, including liver injury and events that can cause death. Werber added examples of substantial unmet need: Ultragenyx’s new GSD1a and MPS IIIA approvals, plus an anticipated OTC-deficiency filing. For GSD1a, the concrete burden is cornstarch throughout the day to prevent dangerous hypoglycemia; MPS IIIA brings severe neurodevelopmental deterioration.

8. Amgen’s readouts test both target biology and usable differentiation

  • Werber previewed pelacarsen’s AHA presentation the following morning at 8:45 a.m. The Ionis/Novartis Lp(a) program had failed and appeared to show little material benefit in patients with well-controlled LDL and other risks. He wanted subgroup evidence, including relationships with baseline LDL, or clues favoring primary prevention. Amgen might modify its ongoing studies, but how remained “very much TBD.”
  • At ACR the following Wednesday at 8:45 a.m., Werber expected Amgen’s dazodalibep data. He characterized systemic-disease results as “much better” than Novartis’s ianalumab, whose two Phase 3 trials needed pooling for significance. The 24-week data hit both primary and secondary endpoints; the 12-week data hit the primary endpoint and, he thought, showed symptom trends only. He was “fairly optimistic” about the year-end symptomatic-disease study, addressing roughly two-thirds to 75% of patients.
  • Amgen also delivered a beat and raise, with MariTide studies enrolling quickly. Werber expected pen-formulation data by June of next year and thought a filing could follow in the second half of next year, assuming success. Switching studies from other GLP-1 therapies were already underway, adding another development path beyond the initial efficacy discussion.

9. Oncology pipelines put durability and safety beside response rates

  • Werber highlighted another BeOne beat and raise for Brukinsa and positive Phase 2 results for its first-in-class BTK degrader. Additional durability follow-up, explicitly “not safety related,” shifted his filing expectation toward the middle of next year. His hypothesis was that FDA wanted minimum follow-up across patients and subsets, particularly newer patients previously treated with Lilly’s Jaypirca; that explanation remained his interpretation.
  • BeOne’s Phase 3 head-to-head study against Jaypirca was progressing, and Werber shared management’s confidence in demonstrating superiority. Separately, BeOne reiterated that it expected no drug interaction between its PRMT5 candidate and Revolution’s drug. Tango’s interaction problem was, in Werber’s view, the reason Revolution chose the formal BeOne collaboration.
  • Gilead’s CAR-T candidate, anito-cel, faced a December 23 PDUFA date. Werber expected somewhat lower efficacy but substantially better safety than Legend’s product; the ASH abstract offered little new efficacy, leaving the meeting update important. Legend, meanwhile, reported steroid prophylaxis reducing parkinsonian risk from roughly 4–6% to 1.25%—a reduction that still left residual risk.
  • Legend’s early in vivo CAR-T lymphoma update also drew Werber’s attention: essentially a 100% response rate, durability extending to five months and fairly clean safety so far. He compared those early responses favorably with existing ex vivo CAR-T products. His enthusiasm was explicitly about a promising early signal, with longer observation still ahead.