Vol.210 Which Countries Offer the Best Prospects Over the Next Decade: 黄渊普 on the New Wave of Going Global
Summary
黄渊普’s core call for 2035 is that “the strong get stronger” (“强者会更强”): China and the U.S. together accounted for roughly 48% of global GDP in 2025, and with India the 3 countries already make up more than half, potentially rising to 55% by 2035. China, the U.S. and India are therefore the 3 anchor markets no company can avoid. If a company gives up China, cannot enter the U.S. because of geopolitics, and refuses to study India out of prejudice, it is voluntarily forfeiting coverage of more than half the global economy—making it hard to become a large company.
AI and automation are ending the traditional “flying-geese” pattern of industrial relocation; the likeliest beneficiaries going forward are mega-population markets and gateway countries to developed markets. Chinese manufacturing, combined with engineers, supply chains and automation, could continue growing in output over the next 5 years. The case for U.S. manufacturing reshoring also strengthens because it sits close to the world’s largest consumer market. Indonesia, which could approach 300M people, and gateways such as Mexico and Hungary still have a role; countries relying on cheap labor alone for industrial upgrading will find it increasingly difficult.
“The biggest fear in going global is choosing the wrong country” (“做出海最怕的是选错国家”), but the answer is not to guess the single winner; it is to assess population, energy, political stability, inequality, views of China and fit with one’s own business together. Many companies went to Indonesia or Mexico simply because “someone there was a friend.” When geopolitical, customs, fiscal or social risks emerge, they may only then begin questioning the choice. The value of scientific decision-making is knowing that other countries have problems too, so that even in a downturn the company can still say: “This is the country I chose after comparing the alternatives.”
Chinese companies are likely to establish an “efficiency hegemony” (“效率霸权”) over the next decade, while facing stronger backlash over tariffs, labor and industrial protection. Using iRobot’s bankruptcy and acquisition by a Chinese supplier as an example—and Chinese robot vacuums selling for just 1/3 to 1/5 the price—黄渊普 believes Dyson and other high-margin overseas companies will remain under pressure. The issue is not simply relentless competition; it is that “we have the efficiency advantage but not the narrative advantage,” so mechanized production gets portrayed as an invasion sweeping through local industries like a gale through fallen leaves.
India is not a country Chinese companies must be bullish on, but it is a market and competitor they must study and try to enter. 黄渊普 expects India’s GDP to grow from nearly $5T to nearly $10T by 2035, with a population approaching 1.6B, making it an increasingly powerful third pole beyond China and the U.S. People of Indian origin also occupy management positions across companies in the U.S., the Middle East and Africa. “We cannot repeat the cognitive mistake Americans made when looking at China,” especially by ignoring India’s global narrative capability, which is far stronger than China’s.
Latin America is not uniformly on an uptrend, but even countries in decline offer commercial opportunities for going global: downtrading creates demand for cheap, reliable goods, while political polarization means a local reputational crisis need not kill a brand. BYD’s sales in both Mexico and Brazil exceeded 100K, and Brazil’s labor dispute did not stop sales. After Meituan and Didi entered Brazil, local leader iFood’s share reportedly fell from roughly 80% to below 60%. “When No. 2 and No. 3 fight, they are taking No. 1’s share”—a framing closer to 黄渊普’s observation than “Chinese companies fighting each other.”
2025 may be the inflection point at which China’s international image turns from negative to positive, but the shift comes mainly from dissatisfaction with the U.S., visa waivers and ordinary tourists’ videos—not from Chinese companies suddenly learning to tell their stories. Young people in Europe and elsewhere are rediscovering China through high-speed rail, food and street life, while people over 45 are harder to persuade. 黄渊普 sees the roughly 3 years or more remaining in Trump’s term as a window, and urges companies to raise their investment in local people from 1 point to 3-4 points to turn short-term goodwill into long-term trust.
True globalization is not about 50- and 60-year-old Chinese founders making a tragic circuit through Asia, Africa and Latin America; it is about bringing foreign young people into China, training them for 3-5 years, then sending them back as country managers or cross-cultural entrepreneurial partners. Huawei’s early method—“do not talk orders, just invite customers to Shenzhen”—still works. 黄渊普 is organizing reverse China innovation tours and promoting a global youth talent program, while consumer brands move from “electronic hardware → ideas and emotion → strong cultural products”; Pop Mart, Luckin and MINISO have already opened the middle door.
Deep dive
1. Breaking Out of the Chinese Diaspora Is the First Hurdle in the New Wave of Going Global
Over the past 2.5 years, 黄渊普 has visited nearly, and possibly more than, 65 countries, including Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Tunisia, Morocco, Argentina and Peru. From January last year through February this year, he visited about 20 countries. His target is roughly 10 countries a year: “You cannot study the people behind the new wave of going global by staying in China; you have to go there yourself.”
The old problem was that even when he was abroad, almost all his conversation partners were still Chinese or members of the Chinese diaspora. The original purpose of building an international IP was to break that closed loop, so that in any country he could find local founders and entrepreneurs and hear unfiltered judgments rather than views relayed through Chinese intermediaries.
李翔 noted that 黄渊普’s Instagram following has surpassed 350K. The IP has also become a field-research tool: a preview posted in cities across Latin America can bring 30-40 applications for 10-odd offline spots. Traffic solves the problem of “who to find,” but does not automatically close the gap in locals’ basic understanding of China.
2. Chinese Companies at CES and the Global Conversation Still Look Like Parallel Universes
黄渊普 estimates that Chinese companies account for roughly 1/4 to 1/3 of CES exhibitors, but rarely appear on the speaking stage. Chinese entrepreneurs are not all failing to apply; he knows of Chinese committee members who have encouraged applications and lobbied organizers for years. The final result, however, remains far below the exhibitor share, which he attributes in part to selection bias.
The exhibition halls are not short of Chinese business celebrities. Investors and other people who are difficult to meet in China are everywhere—walking the show, taking photos and holding meetings. Chinese companies have effectively turned CES into an overseas version of a domestic business week: “The people we usually have to schedule in China all came to CES, so we could hold meetings in hotel rooms.”
The most recognizable Chinese face was actually “China’s Trump,” invited by TCL and imitating Trump’s English. Foreign visitors often asked to take photos with him; 黄渊普 himself was asked roughly 10 times. The asymmetry is clear: companies and products arrived at scale, but very few people were recognizable to overseas audiences or able to hold their attention.
There may be 3-4 Chinese-diaspora events every night, but very few international venues genuinely mix Chinese and overseas entrepreneurs. When 李翔 asked whether speaking slots are really valuable, 黄渊普’s answer was that CES is fundamentally a branding venue, and taking the stage signals status. The hardest part is not exhibiting—it is breaking out of the Chinese diaspora.
3. Latin America’s Underestimation of China Coexists with China’s Dismissal of Latin America
When Chinese people discuss Latin America, they often think of the middle-income trap, economic crises and political instability. Many Latin Americans, however, still believe China is inferior to their own countries. In São Paulo, 黄渊普 suggested that local elites consider Tsinghua or Peking University instead of the U.S.; the response was: “What are Tsinghua and Peking?”
Brazilians who can communicate in English generally belong to the local elite, yet some may never have heard of China’s top universities. Argentines retain a strong sense of historical pride, and many believe Argentina was better than China for much of its history. Information about Argentina inside China is almost entirely about decline and crisis. Both sides are underestimating the other.
This perception gap flows directly into business. Local consumers who underestimate China will not pay a premium for Chinese brands; Chinese companies that underestimate local people will not seriously understand their dignity, political positions or psychological makeup. 黄渊普 has therefore shifted his research question from “Where do products sell well?” to “Where is the gap in understanding China the greatest?”
4. Companies First Need to Tell a “Normal China Story,” Not Just Emphasize Low Prices
李翔 pointed out that asking companies to carry the burden of representing a country and its culture is plainly too much. 黄渊普 agrees that this is a national-level question, but still believes companies have a responsibility: Chinese companies’ LinkedIn and Instagram accounts rarely express ideas or values, repeating instead how cheap their products are.
South Korea offers the clearest comparison. K-pop is a cultural industry, but Korean companies are also several levels better at building brands locally and engaging with local people. In Latin America, Chinese culture is still associated mainly with Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan. “Nothing has changed for decades,” which 黄渊普 considers a dangerous signal.
黄渊普 admits he has yet to see a complete model that handles corporate values, the China story and local relationships well at the same time. Strong business execution does not equal strong brand narrative. Chinese companies’ victories still come mainly from products, cost and efficiency.
5. BYD Shows Product Value Can Outlast a Reputational Crisis, but Has Not Erased Labor Stereotypes
黄渊普’s figures are that BYD sold more than 100K vehicles in Mexico and more than 100K in Brazil last year. Some local families had previously driven almost nothing but Japanese cars; when they began switching to EVs, they “turned to BYD almost unanimously,” primarily because of lower electricity bills and total ownership costs.
Green credentials may have generated some goodwill, but 黄渊普 observed another external tailwind: Elon Musk has become unpopular in both Europe and Latin America, pushing some consumers toward BYD. In 王兴’s formulation, the No. 2 and No. 3 players can sometimes benefit not because they are doing exceptionally well, but because “the No. 1 player is simply too hated.” That is not a durable strategy.
Brazil’s 2025 labor dispute sent the claim that “China is a sweatshop” spreading widely, but BYD still got through the episode. 黄渊普 explains that Brazil’s media, political system and interest groups are highly fragmented; one group’s characterization does not automatically become a unified national conclusion. Lula personally attended the rollout of a BYD vehicle and still retains a large support base.
The sharper point is that Brazil has already begun to assume Chinese companies do not care enough about labor. Kuaishou, Meituan-affiliated businesses and others will face similar disputes. Brazilian labor law is more complex than in the U.S. or Europe, making these problems difficult to avoid entirely. If a company provides manufacturing, software or technical value, small issues may be tolerated—but that does not mean trust has been established.
6. The Main Loser in Brazil’s Food-Delivery War, for Now, Is the Previously Comfortable Local Incumbent
Brazil’s food-delivery market was originally dominated by iFood, whose share 黄渊普 puts at roughly 80% at one point. After Meituan and Didi entered and competed for several months, iFood may already have fallen below 60%. On the surface, 2 Chinese companies are fighting; in reality, the incremental share is mainly coming from the local incumbent.
He rejects reducing the episode to “Chinese companies failing to stand together overseas”: “Everyone may argue a bit, but in reality neither of them had much share. They were taking it from that local incumbent that was doing very well and living very comfortably.”
Traditional business wisdom says that when No. 1 and No. 2 fight, No. 3 and No. 4 die. Brazil looks more like No. 2 and No. 3 fighting over No. 1’s market share. For investors, the intensity of competition must be assessed alongside the source of the share being won.
7. International IP Is Both a Content Channel and a Demand Sensor for Choosing the Next Market
In 2025, 黄渊普 met 7-8 Brazilian founders in succession in Shanghai and Shenzhen before realizing that Latin America’s interest in China might be rising, prompting him to visit in person. After he arrived, Brazil also opened visa-free entry to Chinese visitors. He describes the decision as both planned and “a coincidence.”
Instagram allows for low-cost testing before departure. A wave of direct messages from users in a particular country, or an unusually high number of likes, comments and reposts on a related video, can put that country on the field-research list. Market feedback does not replace judgment, but it can signal that “a certain country has suddenly become interested in you.”
After an AI summit in India, he posted a video criticizing how poorly the event was run. It received more than 500K views, thousands of comments and tens of thousands of reposts, along with invitations to speak from universities and entrepreneurs. That does not mean he is bullish on India, but it was a direct demand signal for a visit in the second half of the year.
8. Read a Country’s Prospects Through Locals’ Own Assessments and Political Continuity
Every offline event centers on at least 3 questions: How do locals perceive China? How do they judge their country’s next 10 years? What problems do Chinese companies most commonly face? He then adds local flashpoints such as the Maduro episode, the Panama port dispute, Milei’s reforms and whether Lula can win re-election, probing whether policy can be sustained.
李翔 invoked Peter Thiel’s matrix of optimism versus pessimism and certainty versus uncertainty to ask about the 2035 outlook. 黄渊普’s counterintuitive answer is that compared with Latin America, Chinese people remain relatively optimistic about their own country. Listening to stories of shrinking wealth in Beijing and Shanghai can make people pessimistic; going abroad shows them countries that have been trapped for “20 years” without finding a way out.
Among Argentines who speak English, several plan to move to Italy using dual citizenship. 黄渊普 was surprised: Italy also faces fiscal deficits and an aging population and, in his view, could even fall out of the ranks of developed countries. Yet Argentines prefer Italy, which they believe “may still be sustainable for 10 years.” That reflects how little confidence they have in Argentina’s future.
Brazil is more polarized. The biggest variable is not how strong Lula is, but whether policy can continue. If Lula remains in office, there could at least be 4 consecutive years; if policy lasts 5 years, it could lay some foundation for the following decade. Peru changed presidents 8 times in 10 years, while 黄渊普 sees Chile as having fallen from a position close to developed-country status 10 years ago. Beyond population and resources, regime turnover determines whether a company is facing a strategy or a lottery.
9. Downturn Countries Still Offer Opportunities—Along Different Demand Curves
黄渊普 distinguishes between 2 kinds of going global. Upward-trending countries can support a bet on consumption upgrades; downward-trending countries need “basic, essential, cheap but good-quality products.” A country with weak prospects is not automatically a country Chinese companies should avoid.
Argentina has roughly 13,000 Chinese-run supermarkets, many operated by people from Fuqing. Local residents spend at Chinese supermarkets when they receive money; the stores then aggregate cash and exchange currencies, allowing the Chinese retail network to play a role in the local financial system.
Mainstream Chinese entrepreneurs have largely stayed out of Latin America because of the distance and poor perceptions, leaving early Chinese merchants with deep networks. 黄渊普’s conclusion is not that Argentina deserves a heavy allocation, but that recession markets can still produce overlooked businesses with strong cash flow.
10. By 2035, the Global Economy Will Concentrate Further in 3 Anchor Markets: China, the U.S. and India
黄渊普’s baseline figures are that China and the U.S. together account for roughly 48% of global GDP in 2025, and more than 50% with India included; by 2035, the 3 countries could reach 55%. The relatively bearish conclusion is that “the strong get stronger.”
The Belt and Road and Asia, Africa and Latin America still offer incremental growth. China’s trade with Europe and the U.S. once accounted for 70-80% of its total, but has now fallen below 50%. The Global South does have demand, and Chinese companies have genuinely underpenetrated it. Making up that demand gap does not mean these countries will replicate East Asia’s growth miracle.
If a company has no business in China, cannot enter the U.S. because of geopolitics, and gives up India because it looks down on the country, it has no presence in markets representing more than half of global GDP. 黄渊普 therefore believes that a company absent from all 3 anchor markets will struggle to become a truly large company.
11. AI and Automation Are Rewriting Manufacturing Relocation, Not Simply Accelerating Offshoring
The U.S. is still willing to keep pushing: it feels a sense of crisis around AI and is promoting manufacturing reshoring. 黄渊普 believes factories will ultimately consider how close they are to the market. As automation reduces labor needs, the logic of locating in the world’s largest consumer market becomes stronger; even if a factory does not go to the U.S., it may land in a nearby node such as Mexico with favorable trade arrangements.
China’s manufacturing chain covers the high, middle and low ends. Education, engineers, supply chains and infrastructure have also formed a dense network, making it difficult to relocate the whole system as Europe and the U.S. once moved manufacturing to Asia. China’s manufacturing output could continue rising over the next 5 years rather than falling because of limited offshoring.
Indonesia, whose population could approach 300M, has a local market large enough to support an industrial node. Mexico serves as a gateway to the U.S., and Hungary as a gateway to Europe. For other countries with small populations and little proximity to developed markets, cheap labor alone will not be enough to attract a complete industrial chain.
李翔 raised the variable introduced by the “flying-geese model” (“雁阵模式”) after industries moved to China: because China could absorb exceptionally long supply chains, the procession stopped moving. 黄渊普 believes that framework will largely hold for the next 10 years, with AI further weakening the traditional low-wage recipient model.
12. Young Populations Are Both a Market Dividend and a Political-Risk Amplifier
Population projections cannot be used in isolation. A large young population without jobs, combined with inequality and concentrated wealth, can increase the risk of protests, coups, looting and destruction. 黄渊普 cited young people taking to the streets in Nepal and student protests in Bangladesh in 2024, calling it what the media describes as “Gen Z’s anger.”
Companies must judge whether the local government can maintain stability and respond to shocks during major unrest, and whether the country can take appropriate action at the national level. A large population becomes a market only when employment, distribution and political order are also in place.
Energy is another frequently overlooked hard constraint. Even with Mexico’s per-capita GDP approaching China’s, companies still face power shortages. Without reliable electricity, population and location advantages cannot automatically become manufacturing capability.
A more rational organizational form may therefore be for China to handle R&D while overseas operations are distributed across multiple flexible nodes that can be expanded or exited, rather than investing RMB tens of billions and sending several thousand people to bet on a single country. A distributed footprint is not conservative; it builds geopolitical and social risk into capacity design.
13. China’s “Involution Goes Global” Is an Efficiency Outcome—and Will Inevitably Trigger Stronger Policy Backlash
The defining case 黄渊普 saw at CES was iRobot, a U.S. company with more than 30 years of history that pioneered the home-robotics category before going bankrupt and being acquired by a Chinese supplier. Chinese robot vacuums offer comparable quality at prices as low as 1/3, 1/4 or even 1/5 of the price.
He therefore believes Dyson and other overseas companies that long enjoyed high gross margins could also be squeezed continuously by Chinese competitors. “Even if we Chinese say we cannot compete this way anymore, over the next 10 years we will still compete many overseas companies that are doing well out of business.”
李翔 pointed to Europe’s tariff negotiations over Chinese cars as evidence that local governments will not sit by while domestic industries are disrupted. 黄渊普 agrees: over the next 10 years, China’s trade conflicts with most countries will only become more intense. Companies cannot avoid industrial protection, labor accusations or politicized scrutiny.
BYD’s overseas prices are usually higher than its domestic prices, and its margins are better. 黄渊普 believes BYD is not relying on endless price cuts, but on higher efficiency. His analogy is the British Industrial Revolution’s shock to workshops around the world: “It was not because it deliberately priced low; it was because its efficiency was too high.”
14. A Narrative Deficit Makes Efficiency Look Like Aggression, Not Progress
黄渊普 summarizes the problem this way: “We have the efficiency advantage, but not the narrative advantage” (“我们掌握了效率优势，但是没有掌握叙事优势”). Western narratives can portray Chinese companies as sweeping away domestic industries like a gale through fallen leaves, while Chinese companies have not fully gained the narrative authority to explain their advantages in technology, organization and supply chains.
He has seen many overseas companies that are not hardworking and are consumed by internal politics, yet continue to thrive as beneficiaries of the previous era. Silicon Valley is now “more brutal than 996,” but does not carry the same level of negative labeling as Chinese companies. This does not erase Chinese companies’ problems, but it shows that the narrative surrounding competition is not neutral.
Latin American media and large corporations are often controlled by a small number of families. They shape ordinary consumers’ opinions and may also compete directly with Chinese companies. Consumers may buy Chinese products to save money while still criticizing China at the level of ideas. Sales and brand affinity must be viewed separately.
15. China’s Most Resonant Story May Be Ordinary People Changing Their Fortunes
DeepSeek has prompted many Latin Americans to reconsider China since 2025, but they often assume that such a company must have been founded by a scion of a major family or a government official. 黄渊普 tells them that the founders of DeepSeek, Unitree Robotics, JD.com, ByteDance and other companies come from ordinary families. Their response is often an astonished: “Really?”
In many countries, even if the middle class works hard, the next generation has little chance of becoming a super-rich individual or the founder of a major company. Stories of grassroots Chinese entrepreneurs crossing class boundaries can temporarily move local people beyond ideology and help them see China as a society where substantial social mobility still exists.
黄渊普 sets an unusually high bar for a brand: “Only when others look up to you can you truly have a brand.” Technical efficiency earns usage; trust earns long-term choice; aspiration can create both a premium and a sense of belonging.
He calls China becoming an “efficiency hegemony” almost a floor-case outcome—the hegemony refers to globally leading production efficiency, not imperialism. The real uncertainty is whether China can also earn trust and aspiration by 2035. Otherwise, it will simply become even more competitive and make overseas markets even more uncomfortable.
16. Superpower Status and a Weak-Country Mindset Are the Deepest Psychological Conflict in Going Global
黄渊普 believes the world is biased against China, but China’s own bias toward the world deserves more scrutiny. Sensitivity born of insecurity is understandable in countries with weak economic performance; China, whose overall national strength is widely viewed as that of a superpower, still often goes abroad with the mindset that “we are being bullied again.”
In dealings with Europe and the U.S., that mindset connects current friction to the “century of humiliation.” In Asia, Africa and Latin America, it becomes a tendency to favor the rich and look down on the poor. When 李翔 asked whether this burden was directed only at the West, 黄渊普 rejected the idea: if Vietnam or India says something negative, Chinese public opinion quickly fights back.
Truly confident people can tolerate criticism from weaker parties. The U.S. is criticized by its own citizens and by people around the world, yet continues to act according to its own logic. If China cannot tolerate negative voices from Brazil, Vietnam or India, it has not completed the psychological transition to being the stronger party.
This positioning affects operations. A company that sees itself as weak will not dare to charge high prices or take responsibility for the local community. 黄渊普 argues that the new wave of going global should develop a sense of responsibility for the world, adding local value beyond profit to corporate objectives rather than treating survival as a permanent excuse.
17. India Is a Third Pole—and a Training Ground for Chinese Companies Competing Globally
黄渊普 expects India’s GDP to grow from nearly $5T to nearly $10T by 2035, while its population rises by more than 100M to approach 1.6B. China and the U.S. will remain the 2 poles, but India will become an increasingly powerful third pole. Whether people acknowledge it will not change the shift in scale.
The competitors Chinese companies face in the Middle East, Africa and the U.S. are often not Indian companies based in India, but Indian people and the Indian diaspora. Indian- and Pakistani-origin communities span frontline, middle and senior roles in the Gulf. The British colonial system also allowed Indians to enter Africa earlier; in many industries, the No. 1 business is run by people of Indian origin, with Chinese companies behind them.
Indian media has long paid attention to China, while Chinese people know very little about India. 黄渊普 worries that China is repeating the mistake the U.S. made when looking at China 20 years ago: focusing only on infrastructure, poverty and governance flaws, assuming the other side would eventually collapse, and missing its rise.
He is not therefore “bullish on India.” He treats India simultaneously as a major market and a global competitor. To understand why people of Indian origin can reach management roles in the U.S., the Middle East and Africa, Chinese companies must enter and observe India rather than rely on emotional mockery.
18. India’s Narrative Power Is China’s Least Willing-to-Admit, Most Important-to-Study Advantage
After one of 黄渊普’s India videos received 500K views, many prominent Indian influencers began following him. Opening their accounts, it is common to see audiences in the hundreds of thousands or above 1M. Very few Chinese entrepreneurs have comparable followings on overseas platforms.
India lacks China’s infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities, but is clearly stronger in language, cultural output and external narrative. Dismissing all of this as exaggeration means missing half of the competition. If Chinese companies want to compete with Indians for global jobs and customers, they need to learn how Indians build visibility.
李翔 noted that Modi is one of the most-followed political figures on X. 黄渊普 added that regardless of one’s view of Modi, his overseas following adds luster to India. His domestic support is no longer as strong as before, and his party lost a substantial number of parliamentary seats in the last election, but his international influence still enhances India’s image. Lula’s habit of livestreaming from his phone, hugging people and greeting them during foreign visits also shows how politicians can actively shorten distance.
19. Chinese Goods Have Reached the World, but Chinese People Remain Psychologically Cut Off from Local Societies
黄渊普 has seen the same scene in multiple countries: Chinese people cluster together, while locals know Chinese have come to do business but can encounter them only in Chinese restaurants. “The goods have gone global,” but human relationships, cultural relationships and community ties have not kept pace.
This absence creates psychological distance. Overseas audiences know China is powerful but feel far removed from it. When planning an Asian trip, they think of Japan or Thailand, rarely China first. 黄渊普 says the number of inbound visitors to China is roughly comparable to Japan, which is disproportionate to China’s landmass, population and cultural scale.
李翔 added Huawei’s early experience: the headquarters’ first task for overseas teams was not to win orders, but to invite customers to Shenzhen and Huawei’s headquarters. 黄渊普 believes this remains the most effective method today—let people build a real experience first, then discuss the commercial relationship.
20. People Who Have Visited China Are an Underused Trust Asset
Among foreigners 黄渊普 meets in Shanghai, roughly 8 out of 10 say they worried about surveillance, questioning, discrimination or being bullied before coming, but had a good experience after arriving. Because expectations were negative, an actual day-to-day experience of 7-8 points out of 10 can create a powerful contrast.
If every company contributes something by inviting more customers, partners and young people to China, the result may be more effective than abstract publicity. Visitors generally become more willing to speak positively about China, but Chinese companies have not systematically turned them into employees, partners or market advocates.
黄渊普 believes the best state over the next 10 years should be called globalization, not one-way outbound expansion. Sending 50- and 60-year-old founders who do not speak the local language to travel through Asia, Africa and Latin America is a tragic picture. A more sustainable model is to train foreign talent in China for 3-5 years and then send them back as country or regional managers.
21. International Students Are Becoming a Global Talent Pool Rather Than a Quota Target
Many universities previously relied on intermediaries to fill international-student quotas, using scholarships to attract average-caliber students who only wanted to spend 4 years in China. 黄渊普 observed a turning point beginning last year: applications to good schools exceeded available places, intermediaries were no longer needed to pad the numbers, and the share of students from Europe and the U.S. also increased.
In Beijing, he met a Bulgarian woman who was an undergraduate at Tsinghua and later discovered through her social feed that she had interpreted for a visiting Bulgarian vice president. He also met a young man born in Germany to a Chinese mother and an American father, who said he chose Renmin University for undergraduate study because he personally judged China’s prospects to be better—not because his mother pushed him to do so.
These young people can articulate both China’s strengths and weaknesses, and their decisions are more autonomous. 黄渊普 envisions a “Global Youth Talent Program” to help high-quality foreign students already in China find jobs and receive training, then channel them to companies going global, closing the gap between universities, students and employers.
He would go further by pairing Chinese and foreign young people to build brands in niche countries—for example, having a Tsinghua student familiar with Bulgaria work with Chinese entrepreneurs to develop the market. Compared with a purely Chinese team, this resembles the path early multinationals used when Singaporean and Hong Kong Chinese entered China.
22. 2025’s Image Reversal Creates an Approximately 3-Year Narrative Window
A European media outlet told 黄渊普 that positive China content on overseas social media had overtaken negative content in 2025. He was initially surprised, but later concluded that the fact his “plastic English” still attracted substantial attention meant he had encountered a broader shift in global perceptions.
The reversal first came from comparison: global audiences have become more hostile toward Trump, the U.S. and its position in the Israel-Palestine conflict, giving China goodwill by comparison. The second factor was the arrival of young tourists after visa waivers. They did not rely on The New York Times or the BBC; they used their phones to film high-speed rail, food and ordinary street life.
At least 1M overseas creators have spontaneously documented China, with no institution dictating how they should express themselves. When ordinary people see foreign tourists treated without discrimination and helped by locals, they begin to realize that “China is actually a pretty normal country.”
黄渊普’s generational judgment is direct: people over 45 in Europe, North America and across Asia, Africa and Latin America were shaped by existing Western education systems and are difficult to persuade. Young people are the better target. Trump’s remaining term of at least roughly 3 years is a window to improve China’s national brand and corporate soft power, not a victory already secured.
23. Companies Should Raise Their Investment in Local People from 1 Point to 3-4 Points
黄渊普 expects Trump to basically lose this year’s midterm elections, with Democrats potentially taking the House and even the Senate. But once someone is invited in, sending him away is harder; Trump could still create more global chaos before leaving office. A period when the U.S. is distracted may give China room to build cultural, brand and national narratives. This is a conditional judgment, not a certain outcome.
Chinese companies do not need to match the level of local investment made by Western companies immediately. If the current score is 1 out of 10, raising it to 3-4—by using more local people, respecting local culture and participating in communities—could materially improve goodwill because the starting point and expectations are both low.
黄渊普 uses his own example to lower the barrier to speaking: “With my level of English, I still dare to post short English videos overseas—what pressure do you have?” What companies need is not broadcast-level English, but enough industry depth to explain electric vehicles, chips, smart manufacturing and other sectors clearly.
His next idea is to train more Chinese entrepreneurs and young people for free, creating a cross-industry content matrix. 黄渊普 admits that he has deliberately added a macro mission to his work because if writing and research have no such narrative, “life feels meaningless.”
24. Deep Overseas Expansion Starts by Redoing Country Selection, Not Chasing the Next Hot Spot
Nearly all of roughly 5,400 A-share listed companies have already begun going global; “go global or be eliminated” has become reality rather than a slogan. Falling enthusiasm does not mean demand has disappeared. It means companies have realized that geopolitics is beyond their control—even a large company that operated the Panama ports for years can suddenly find itself on the back foot.
Companies previously rotated with the hype: Southeast Asia first, then the Middle East, Mexico and Africa. 黄渊普 estimates that Brazil may have its turn in 2026 after the visa waiver, followed by South Asia and India as China-India relations and visa access improve. But whether popularity matches long-term prospects remains an open question.
AI is also forcing an upgrade to the evaluation framework. 3 years ago, he mainly looked at population and 5-year GDP growth. Today, the analysis must also include automation’s effect on industrial relocation, geopolitical relations with China, local perceptions of China, and which industries are suited to entering in which form.
AI has already lowered the threshold for brand expression. In the past, stiff copy on an English-language website or Amazon store immediately revealed a Chinese seller; today, at least in professional polish, it is difficult to tell. As the language gap narrows, country selection, products and organizational capability are exposed more directly.
25. The Endgame of Country Selection Is Not “the Best” Country, but the Fit Between Market, Organization and Life
In Mexico, 黄渊普 met again with a prominent entrepreneur who had put down roots there for 15-16 years. 3 years earlier, the entrepreneur had been full of energy; this time, his temples were gray and his face weathered, with repeated sighs in his speech. What truly tormented him was not financing or layoffs, but wondering: “Did I choose the wrong country at the beginning?”
The entrepreneur said the new government, facing fiscal deficits and World Cup construction spending, would seek revenue from foreign companies. A shipment worth RMB200K could be held at customs, with officials demanding RMB100K or even RMB300K. Even abandoning the goods would be painful. 黄渊普 did not conclude that Mexico was the worst choice; he argued that an uncomparative decision is most likely to collapse under pressure.
黄渊普 heard the same warning in an interview with 周亚辉 after years of focusing on Africa: he admitted that if he could start again, he might have chosen a mainstream developed country in Europe or the U.S. 李翔 pointed out that successful companies also exist in Africa and Mexico. 黄渊普 accepted the rebuttal and ultimately framed the question as whether the company, industry, talent and country fit together.
A Hunan friend based in Kenya offered a different answer. Quiet by nature, he felt oppressed by Shenzhen’s crowds and high-rises; when he saw the grasslands in Kenya, he felt he had “found himself” and became willing to integrate with the local government, employees and culture. The best country may not be the one that makes the most money, but the one that keeps key talent in place and allows them to truly enter society.
26. Chinese Brands Are Moving from Spec-Sheet Advantages Toward Emotion, Values and Cultural Pull
黄渊普 sees Pop Mart as a case above the efficiency-led overseas expansion represented by TikTok, Temu and SHEIN. Consumers like it not because of performance or quantitative specifications, but because it meets an emotional need. It shows Chinese companies beginning to sell “I just like it,” rather than only “cheaper and more useful.”
In New York, he observed roughly 10 Luckin stores, commonly rated 4.2-4.5, versus nearby Starbucks stores at roughly 3.8-4.0. Young people around New York University like Luckin’s digital experience, app and range of flavors, while also disliking Starbucks as an “uncool big company.” 黄渊普 therefore believes Luckin’s overseas potential may exceed that of Chagee or Mixue.
MINISO serves the dignified consumption needs of a global middle class whose wealth has declined: the price is affordable, while some design and brand feel remain. When 黄渊普 asks people on New York streets which Chinese brands they know, many mention MINISO. Awareness is beginning to move beyond the Chinese diaspora.
黄渊普’s category ladder is: first, electronics, digital products and AI hardware with quantifiable advantages; then consumer products carrying ideas and culture; and only later strong cultural products such as Moutai and Wuliangye. By 2035, if China’s soft power is strong enough, overseas consumers may understand them as “the taste of China.”
27. Reverse Globalization Should Make China the Laboratory Every Global Innovator Must Visit
Going global is one side of a coin; the other is bringing overseas entrepreneurs, consumers and talent into China. 黄渊普 launched a China Innovation Tour: in March, a group of roughly 8-9 people visited Shenzhen and Guangzhou; the Shanghai-Hangzhou group scheduled for April 19-24 was initially capped at 15 but sold 20 tickets before being taken off sale. Larger groups in Beijing and Shanghai are planned next.
His sales pitch is that someone who visits Silicon Valley every 1-2 years but has not visited the Greater Bay Area, the Yangtze River Delta or Beijing in 5 years will lose sight of “half of global innovation.” After 2022, many foreign companies left China and lost their sense of Chinese innovation; when Chinese companies later entered their home markets, they were suddenly surprised.
A German journalist wrote after the Berlin auto show that Chinese companies had not suddenly become stronger; German arrogance had caused it to ignore 4-5 years of Chinese progress. 黄渊普 observes that foreign companies are returning as innovation centers and R&D centers. Even if they treat their China operations as cost centers, they still need to know what is happening: “Otherwise, you won’t even know how you died.”
He describes China as a “world laboratory” (“世界实验室”): hydrogen energy, lithium batteries and other routes are tested in parallel, while 34 provincial-level administrative units compete like 34 supercompanies. Once one place pulls ahead, officials and experience are copied elsewhere. Waste is the cost of trial and error; scale turns local experiments into national industrial advantages.
28. The Next Generation of Global Organizations Will Be Built by Chinese Engineering Capability and Cross-Cultural Youth
黄渊普 also produced an English “Study in China” booklet and sells consulting for studying in China; some Americans have already paid. He recommends that overseas young people consider Chinese STEM programs and 985 universities, especially in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, because China’s density of engineers and innovation capability is raising the return on educational investment.
His generational observation is that entrepreneurs born in the 1970s may already have financial freedom but lack brand confidence because they grew up when the West was overwhelmingly dominant. Those born in the 1990s received less of the era’s dividend, but are willing to say directly that the West is weak here and there. Combined with respect and expressive ability, that mindset may be better suited to building global brands.
黄渊普 does not advocate bluntly demanding that foreigners accept China. His message to foreign audiences is: “I don’t owe you an explanation” (“我不是欠你一个解释”). He compares himself to a Briton in 1830 explaining China’s ongoing technological revolution to people who had not yet recognized the impact of the Industrial Revolution. Whether they believe it is ultimately their own survival choice.
The goal is not for purely Chinese teams to control overseas markets, but for outstanding Chinese young people and foreign young people who have lived in China and understand it to build companies together. If product efficiency, local relationships and cultural confidence can coexist inside one organization, Chinese companies can move from selling goods to building truly global brands.