Summary

Trump’s new tariffs on April 2 did not include Mexico in the additional-tariff scope, prompting clients who had been waiting on the sidelines to move faster. 苏秀勇 said, “From April 3 to now, I’ve received 5 or 6” urgent requests to build plants, with clients pressing him to “find me land as soon as possible and show me factories as soon as possible.” He has in turn urged clients to decide quickly, as land prices may continue to rise: a friend’s 5-hectare farm was once worth MXN300,000 (about RMB110,000), while 1,000 square meters cost RMB110,000 last year.
Supply-chain migration is driven by constraints, not directives: North and South American suppliers may require Chinese suppliers to move production to Mexico or risk losing orders. 苏秀勇 confirmed that one supplier was told, in response to Tesla’s sourcing requirements, that not building a plant in Mexico could mean losing the supply opportunity. But established supply chains “don’t dare cut everything off in one go”; they will only “reduce your supply step by step.” Many Chinese companies use US or Singapore entities to hold their Mexican subsidiaries, and it takes 3 or 4 layers of ownership to trace them back to the Chinese parent—on the surface, a process of “de-China-ization.”
Monterrey has already drawn roughly 600 Chinese companies—“draw a circle around Monterrey and you can assemble a car from what’s inside”—making it comparable to Dongguan. It is a 2-hour drive from Texas, but its transportation and living infrastructure “may not even match China’s tier-4 or tier-5 cities.” Building materials are 98% shipped from China; insufficient port throughput and strikes in 2023 delayed lead times so badly that the company briefly considered leaving Mexico.
Total labor costs are not lower than in China: general workers earn 2,800–3,200 pesos a week, and after 16% tax and benefits, the all-in cost is about RMB7,000 a month or more. Overtime is not part of the local work culture, and overtime pay runs at 1.5x, 2x, or even 3x. Geologically, many central cities and Monterrey can hit shale or bedrock after excavating just 40 centimeters; earthwork costs can jump from RMB50-plus to RMB200-plus per unit, but foundations barely settle.
Security conditions have improved in measurable terms: along the 546-kilometer route from San Luis Potosí to Monterrey, military and police checkpoints fell from 6 in 2024 to 3 by year-end and just 1 in 2025. 苏秀勇 attributed the change to “poverty narrowing people’s ambitions,” saying theft and robbery declined sharply as more investment companies arrived. The risk remains probabilistic: a client’s Mexican colleague was “shot twice in the leg” at around 4 p.m. on a Saturday. Su’s own interpretation was that the colleague may have refused simply to pay and confronted the robbers; he typically carries 3,000–5,000 pesos when going out.
苏秀勇 directly rejects the claim that most manufacturing businesses in Mexico lose money: “That isn’t losing money; that’s investment.” Clients that built plants in 2019 are now expanding, while Jinma Group is running at full capacity on Mexican orders and “is no longer even considering the US market.” In his view, companies that still cannot survive locally should look first at whether their China strategy was right and whether localization went deep enough; senior executives conducting field research typically stay only 1–2 weeks and no more than 1 month.
Managing Mexican workers depends on immediate rewards, not promises: bonuses, recognition, and invitations to Chinese annual meetings have shifted some workers from clocking out on time to working until 10 p.m. and taking weekend shifts. But respect is non-negotiable: one worker left on the spot after a Chinese engineer dismissed his welding process—“You don’t respect my process”—and never came back.
The personal cost of going overseas runs through the entire experience: a “slightly more luxurious prison” behind a 6-meter wall, a resignation letter withdrawn the next day, and 13 days of working through dengue fever. A Mexican colleague rides a motorcycle 80 kilometers each way every day simply to return home to his family, reshaping 苏秀勇’s own view of family: “Presence is the longest-lasting expression of love.” He remains bullish, believing 纪联’s 2025 net profit could more than double.

Deep dive

1. Tariff changes accelerate action among clients who had been waiting; land prices may keep rising

诗婕 set the episode’s opening frame: since 2019, Mexico has become one of the hottest destinations for Chinese companies going overseas. Under USMCA, exports to the US face zero or low tariffs, while the “Made in Mexico” label both sidesteps US-China trade friction and improves supply-chain resilience and efficiency.
苏秀勇’s first-hand timeline: as Trump’s presidential bid gained momentum, clients “slowed down step by step.” Mexico’s President Sheinbaum had also said that Mexico might impose additional tariffs on Chinese products, though nothing was implemented. With Mexico excluded from the latest tariff increase, “from April 3 to now, I’ve received 5 or 6” urgent orders.
His message to clients still waiting was blunt: “You need to make your decision as soon as possible … otherwise land prices here may rise further.” The immediate bottleneck is instead a shortage of “business colleagues”—2 people cannot handle the workload.
Land prices tell the story: a friend’s 5-hectare farm once sold for MXN300,000 (about RMB110,000), while 1,000 square meters cost RMB110,000 last year—a “world of difference.” Counterintuitively, the US was the largest source of net foreign investment last year, at 38.7%, followed by the Middle East and Europe; China may have ranked 4th or 5th.

2. A general manager from auto repair—and a predecessor who “disappeared”

苏秀勇’s path took him from repairing cars in Yichang, Hubei, to Zhaotong in Yunnan and then Shenzhen. He later switched to real-estate brokerage and started his own finance company. One dinner with the chairman settled the Mexico assignment in October 2023; he went to Mexico in December 2023. During the interview, he first said he arrived on December 18, then confirmed that he landed in Mexico City on December 28—“I hadn’t done sufficient preparation.” His imagined Mexico consisted only of “rampant drugs, heat, and brown people.”
The company’s history began with consulting in 2014, expanded into Mexican consulting in 2016, and led to a Mexican engineering company in 2021, which began taking business in 2022. It now has projects under construction in 17 countries. By 2019, 5 Chinese clients had already bought land and built plants in Mexico, primarily to serve US customers.
The previous general manager left without a handover and “disappeared”: 苏秀勇 said he colluded with suppliers, misappropriated about RMB2M, and fled. Because the events took place in Mexico, he could not be prosecuted in China. Su thought the predecessor might have picked up some local vices and mentioned gambling and, to his knowledge, drug use, but did not explicitly identify either as the reason for the embezzlement. His own self-protection philosophy is: “The only way to keep yourself from reaching out for something is not to know that these things exist, not to know whether they’re good or bad, and simply not to try them.”

3. The real mechanism of supply-chain relocation: constraints, not commands

Suppliers in North and South America require Chinese suppliers to produce locally or risk losing orders. “You can’t call it blackmail, but it is a constraint,” 苏秀勇 said. Asked about Tesla, he confirmed that one supplier was pushed to Mexico to meet Tesla’s demand and could lose the supply opportunity if it refused. But until the new supply chain is mature, suppliers “don’t dare cut the entire supply chain off in one go”; they will “reduce your supply step by step.”
A superficial de-China-ization is visible in many companies’ ownership structures. Tracing the holding company and parent company upward through 3 or 4 layers may eventually lead back to a Chinese entity; some companies use US or Singapore companies to hold their Mexican subsidiaries.

4. On the verge of exiting: insufficient port throughput compounded by strikes

The delivery crisis in 2023 was straightforward: Mexico had only 2 ports, throughput was inadequate, and a major strike hit at the same time. Building materials were “98% imported from China.” Materials could not reach job sites, while workers were paid weekly; delays created additional cash-flow pressure and damaged customer perceptions, affecting the entire business chain.
The turnaround came in early 2024, when 3 projects were signed successfully and “step by step laid the foundation for us in Mexico.” Headquarters had genuinely considered exiting the country.

5. Quantifiable security improvements—and the risks that remain

苏秀勇 often cites the same data point: on the 546-kilometer route from San Luis Potosí to Monterrey, there were 6 military and police checkpoints with machine guns in 2024, 3 by year-end, and just 1 in 2025. Su explained the decline by saying that poverty narrows people’s ambitions and added that these incidents had fallen sharply as the number of investment companies increased.
Monterrey still preserves a historical reminder in one bar: a bullet-riddled wall left in place after gang members, more than 10 years ago, held a gun to the owner’s head and demanded protection money. The owner kept the wall during renovations “so everyone could witness Mexico’s development.”
The fear cycle has not disappeared. A client’s Mexican colleague was driving from Querétaro to San Luis on a Saturday after 4 p.m. when he was “shot twice in the leg” amid traffic. Based on his own interpretation, Su guessed the colleague may have refused simply to hand over money and got into a confrontation with the robbers. That is why he carries 3,000–5,000 pesos when he goes out: “If I give him 3,000–5,000 pesos, I don’t think he’ll hurt me”; offering only 300–500 pesos might instead anger the attacker. These days he says he is “not afraid anymore,” while joking that perhaps he has simply “not walked enough night roads.”

6. Monterrey is Mexico’s Dongguan—but its infrastructure trails China’s tier-4 and tier-5 cities

Monterrey may now have about 600 Chinese companies and sits 2 hours by car from Texas. “Draw a circle around Monterrey and you can assemble a car from what’s inside,” 苏秀勇 said, describing the industrial ecosystem as “the equivalent of Dongguan in China.”
The gap is in the surrounding infrastructure: there are no trains or high-speed rail, freight is expensive, and Su frequently drives between Monterrey, San Luis, Saltillo, Guadalajara, León, Querétaro, and Mexico City to move equipment and parts. In his view, the overall transportation and living infrastructure in the Mexico and Thailand he has visited “may not even match China’s tier-4 or tier-5 cities.”
TCL and Foxconn chose Ciudad Juárez, which is closer to the US border than Monterrey—but “not as safe as Monterrey.”

7. Volcanic rock: upfront costs triple or quadruple, but foundations barely settle

A rumor that the ground at the Hofusan Industrial Park could not be penetrated was eventually clarified: the obstruction was volcanic rock, not metal. Excavators could not dig through it normally, so workers had to break it with pickaxes. In many central cities and in Monterrey, hard soil means shale or bedrock can appear after just 40 centimeters of excavation.
Jinma Group’s experience illustrates the trade-off. Earthwork was priced at just over RMB50 under the contract, but after rock was encountered, the price was renegotiated to more than RMB200—“the cost increased 3 or 4 times in an instant.” The upside is that this soil typically does not require piles; the foundation “is almost impossible to settle,” leaving little additional maintenance spending later.

8. Turning “clocking in and out to the second” into voluntary overtime

In the original setup, the workday began at 8 a.m., but workers might arrive at 8:10, 8:15, or even 8:30. At 5 p.m., they would clock out “without missing a second,” go home, and stop handling work; they would not answer calls or respond to messages.
The incentive system combined employee-of-the-month-style recognition, immediate rewards of 300 or 500 pesos, and annual invitations for Mexican colleagues to attend meetings in China. The goal was to show that “after working overtime, you get recognition, you get money, and you get the chance to be promoted.” Su said workers can now work from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. and take shifts on Saturdays and Sundays.
The lesson was that promises do not work. Su initially copied the Chinese boss’s habit of “drawing you a pie,” then switched to paying immediately. A cleaner received 200 or 300 pesos every half-month and eventually began washing, folding, and hanging Su’s clothes as well. “Money let her feel all the warmth.”

9. Respect is non-negotiable; integration runs both ways

A Chinese engineer insisted that a Mexican colleague change his welding process. The worker said, “You don’t respect my process,” walked out, and never returned. Direct, cutting language common in China can lead workers here to say nothing, explain nothing, and simply not show up the next day.
Integration also appears in small gestures. A 24-year-old Mexican engineer who had been with the company for more than 2 years learned to hold a cup with both hands and, when toasting, lower his cup only after the other person lowered theirs. Su and local colleagues also regularly miscue the handshake and fist-bump rituals; both sides interpret adapting to the other person’s style as respect.
The low-cost gestures matter too. On construction sites reaching 40–50°C, Su buys colleagues large bottles of Coke and ice and gives them cigarettes, telling them: “You’re not just my employee. You’re my colleague. You’re my friend.”

10. The all-in labor-cost ledger—and a spending culture built around Saturday payday

Su was not simply disputing wage levels; he was emphasizing total labor cost. “Their labor cost won’t be lower than China’s. Every Chinese company calculates this.” General workers earn 2,800–3,200 pesos a week, or about RMB1,000–1,200. After 16% tax, food vouchers, severance, and holiday benefits, the all-in cost is “around RMB7,000 a month, or even higher.” The minimum wage also rose to 2,200 pesos this year.
Overtime is not part of the local work culture; when it happens, overtime pay is 1.5x, 2x, or even 3x. Prices are high as well: canned Coke costs 17–18 pesos, or about RMB6–7, while bottled Coke costs 23–25 pesos. The government sets price standards for basic foods such as tacos, and prices cannot exceed them.
“We pay wages on Saturday morning, and some workers have already started borrowing money to get through Wednesday or Thursday.” Weekends bring barbecues and beer; on Monday, workers may not show up or may arrive late after drinking too much.
诗婕 contrasted that with the Chinese lower-income workers she encountered earlier in her career covering social news, who were “extremely hard on themselves” and rarely talked about personal entertainment. Mexican blue-collar workers may face similar material conditions, she said, but are “very good at finding pleasure in life.” On the night of the recording, Su said a neighbor’s party might run until 3 or 4 a.m. the next morning.

11. Historical memory, language identity, and conglomerate-style inequality

苏秀勇 relayed a colleague’s girlfriend’s view that 51% of Mexico’s land had once been taken by the US through seizure, purchase, or even forced purchase, and that about one-third of US territory originated in Mexico. When Su asked whether she felt national humiliation, she said no. He also noted that Spanish rulers built a church on the foundations of a Sun Temple; locals now worship Jesus and “have already forgotten the Sun God.”
卫诗婕 then described speaking with a Mexican official who insisted on using Spanish because, in his view, it was “the most beautiful language in the world.” She contrasted that with the Chinese resistance to having their culture overthrown. This was the host’s comparison and line of questioning, not 苏秀勇’s view.
Su once saw a wealthy person whose building had 2 guards in the lobby, 1 at the elevator, 2 outside the office, and another employee serving as a nanny. He believes wealthy people operate across government, legal, commercial, and industrial spheres. 卫诗婕 suggested that the wealth gap may make ordinary people lose faith that effort can change their fate; Su responded that “this is part of the reason.”

12. Going out to buy a chicken and ending up at a party: popular warmth and a culture of the dead

Locals repeatedly warned Su not to go into the Mexican countryside because it was dangerous, but he still went alone to buy a live chicken. People there kept chickens as pets and some did not even know how to kill one. They were surprised that Su wanted to eat the chicken, yet still offered him beer and food. On the most memorable occasion, he failed to buy a chicken and was instead pulled into a party. “That kind of happiness is contagious. It doesn’t require language.”
Mexican colleagues take pride in inviting Chinese colleagues home. As they reach the village entrance, they roll down all the car windows and turn the music up full blast, “afraid that other people won’t know a Chinese colleague has come to my house for a party.”
Death culture is visible everywhere: a cemetery may sit across the street from a busy commercial district, and a crematorium in Mexico City is about 150 meters from the consulting firm’s office. Skeleton and skull toys are common. The conversation referred to a Mexican animated film as 《飞屋环游记》, or Up; Su said that even before leaving China, the film made him feel Mexican culture and China’s ancestor-worship traditions were “the same at the core.” The title as stated was not clarified in the conversation.

13. A luxury prison, a resignation letter, and dengue fever

The isolation began immediately: unable to speak the language and afraid to go out at night, Su worked and lived in the same compound, surrounded by a 6-meter wall and cameras. It felt like “a slightly more luxurious prison.” He repeatedly urged Chinese headquarters executives to spend 2 or 3 months in Mexico to experience it directly, though Su said Mexican visas are currently difficult to obtain.
By late October or early November last year, homesickness “had already pushed you to the limit.” He submitted a resignation letter and withdrew it the next day: “You can’t have a complete life and family after all; we’re not born into a wealthy family.” He then began worrying, “What if China really approves it—what would I do?”
During dengue fever, his temperature reached 38.9°C or 38.7°C. He remained freezing under 2 blankets. The local doctor prescribed only 1 medication and told him to take it for a week; after Su insisted on an injection, he still had to sign a consent form. He recovered after 13 days and “never stopped working” during the illness. His explanation was: “I believe in fate. When your fate reaches this point, nobody can save you.”
After 《激流2》 aired, his eldest daughter sent him a message saying, “Dad, you really have it hard out there,” and cried during a video call. Before then, he had always reported good news and not bad news during their long-distance calls.

14. A 160-kilometer daily commute for family—and the way Mexico reshaped a Chinese worker’s view of home

The image that moved Su most was a Mexican colleague riding a motorcycle 80 kilometers each way every day simply because he “has to go home and be with my family every day.” Su compared it with his years in Shenzhen: he had never heard of anyone commuting from Huizhou or Dongguan to Shenzhen every day and then returning home at night. 卫诗婕 summarized the Chinese pattern as sacrificing family time for work convenience or career development.
Mexico changed him: his short temper eased, and “the romantic things I had never said to my wife before—I feel I said them all during this one year here.” As his wife puts it, “Presence is the longest-lasting declaration of love” (“陪伴是最长情的告白”).
Overseas rotation creates its own trap. Some executives taking companies abroad agree to return to China after 2 or 3 years, but companies may keep extending the assignment. Businesses are reluctant to let them go because replacing them means “starting the磨合 all over again”—the team below must rebuild its working relationship from scratch.

15. Interpreting “闯”: “That isn’t losing money; that’s investment”

Su’s reading of “闯墨西哥”—breaking into Mexico—is that Chinese companies arrived much later than Japanese and South Korean brands. To win acceptance in a market where Honda and Kia are already established, a new brand must invest more time, energy, planning, and strategy. BYD, Great Wall, Changan, Sany, and Trumpchi are now “selling very well,” while Hongqi will enter Mexico in June this year. Chinese cars have improved significantly in intelligent features and driving experience across internal-combustion, hybrid, and EV models, but brand-building requires more time and capital.
He rejected the claim that manufacturing companies in Mexico mostly lose money. Clients that built plants in 2019 “are all expanding now”; temporary losses during a 1-to-3-year gestation period “aren’t losing money; they’re investment” (“那不叫亏钱，那叫投入”). If a company still cannot survive locally, Su said the key questions are whether its China strategy was directionally right and whether it has integrated deeply enough into the local market. 诗婕 added that going overseas is a fundamental test of organizational capability; Su replied that some companies forget the original gestation period after they go abroad.
The source of the misjudgment is often shallow research. Senior executives typically spend only 1 or 2 weeks on the ground, and no more than 1 month. Su believes mid- and senior-level managers should stay for 1 or 2 months, understand the local culture, geography, and environment, and only then set strategy.

16. Mexico is itself a market: Jinma at full capacity and a looser solar regime

This pushes back against the idea that Chinese companies use Mexico only as an export springboard. One industrial park in San Luis Potosí has more than 10 Chinese companies; customers include BMW in the same park and Ford, Chevrolet, Toyota, and Kia nearby. Jinma Group, a die-casting and forging company from Rizhao, has received enough local Mexican orders to run its production line at full capacity and “is no longer even considering the US market.” Chinese products have an advantage because about 65% of materials cost can be imported from China, at prices below Mexican procurement levels and with improved quality; Su used the service life of faucet switches as an example.
Policy is also easing at the margin. Su said the Sheinbaum government raised the single-plant solar-power cap from 500 kVA to 700 kVA and judged that it “may be loosened further.” He compared CFE with China’s State Grid, arguing that Mexico has abundant sunlight but insufficient electricity, making renewables “the only choice.” Companies that bought land early may already have recorded appreciation on the books even if their plants are not yet profitable.
Mexico’s 130M people are a major market in their own right. “2025 net profit could more than double,” Su said, adding that he remains “full of confidence in the Mexican market.”

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