David Ulevitch

A16Z’s more-than-$15 billion new set of funds turns scale into an explicit national-technology obligation. Ulevitch describes it as the largest set of funds in a16z history and later frames it as the largest bet in American history on America winning the next century of technology. Invoking Andy Grove’s warning that an industry leader inherits responsibility for the industry’s ethics and direction, Horowitz defines the firm’s role as helping America win the AI revolution through investment, government integration and citizen access, and allied integration.

Horowitz’s American-dynamism thesis rests on durable rights and the credible promise that builders get “a chance.” America’s opportunity is imperfect, but entrepreneurs can bet their lives on an idea without expecting arbitrary confiscation; in his reading of “self-evident” rights, freedoms come from God or a higher source rather than government, so government cannot take them away.

The U.S. started far behind China specifically in integrating AI with government, even as ChatGPT challenged the broader conventional wisdom that China led overall. Horowitz says American entrepreneurs and a government willing to change the rules are now catching up quickly, a development he finds heartening and sees reflected in current conflicts.

Horowitz reads the Anthropic–Department of War breakdown as a commercial exit, not a genuine philosophical impasse. Because Anthropic was already deployed and held extraordinary leverage as the U.S. was about to go to war, he argues it could have secured anything reasonable it requested, probably more than it should have; walking away and not returning Emil’s calls instead suggests it “wanted out of the deal,” though he does not know why.

His advice to founders starts from the premise that war and crime persist. Employees should not assume they are ethically or geopolitically wiser than the State Department, the Department of War, or intelligence agencies, or decide that personnel risking their lives should not receive the best technology.

The allied industrial thesis is capability-specific: Mexico for high-quality manufacturing and Japan for robotics, supply chains, and defense alignment. Mexico’s expertise can support reindustrialization but requires greater security across a “thin border”; Japan can address America’s robot-supply-chain deficit while its defense spending moves from 0% to 3% of GDP and its interests align with America’s on China.

Venture is becoming a barbell of scaled multi-category platforms and narrow specialists, squeezing firms in the middle. When roughly 15 companies per year could ever reach $100 million in annual revenue, small partnerships made sense; now that “every interesting company that gets started is a technology company,” coverage requires scale, shared services, and centralized authority capable of reorganizing.

Media strategy has flipped from minimizing mistakes to earning attention across unlimited channels. The winning founder or official must be interesting while remaining anchored to a consistent message; if something goes wrong, Horowitz’s prescription is to “do 10 podcasts tomorrow and flood the zone.”

Horowitz’s biggest worry is American pessimism about technology rather than a shortage of technical ambition. He tentatively recalls a poll showing over 70% optimism about AI in China versus less than 30% in America. He relays that someone in Japan said its startup ecosystem is restarting around AI, then makes categorical upside claims: “we’re going to end traffic deaths,” cure cancer, and end poverty as currently understood. Like fire, AI can cause severe harm, but its dangers can be managed without surrendering its benefits.

🔗 Original source & video: Ben Horowitz on American Dynamism and the Future of AI | The a16z Show

America’s grid problem is institutional atrophy as much as physical capacity. Ryan McEntush says the system “effectively froze” in the early 2000s as manufacturing shifted to Asia, leaving operators without the workforce or skill to plan and execute large projects quickly or cheaply. David Ulevitch adds the stark comparison: U.S. per-capita energy use peaked in 1973, while China’s energy use increased ninefold over the same period.

Distributed generation and storage could leapfrog a grid where interconnection can take a decade and transformer backlogs reportedly exceed 20 years. David describes the grid as roughly century-old technology operating near capacity; Erin Price-Wright argues for placing solar, batteries and load together, bypassing some interconnection and delivery infrastructure whose costs keep rising even as generation gets cheaper. Data centers already embody the urgency: “I can’t afford to wait 10 years… I need this power now, today.”

Texas is the panel’s proof point for deploying cheap solar and batteries at speed. Erin says the state roughly doubled solar capacity in three years and added thousands of batteries, improving its ability to absorb sharp demand changes; Ryan argues every state should study ERCOT’s distributed model, while acknowledging that regulated markets make replication harder. Erin describes the manufacturing dependence on China, while David warns that losing Chinese battery supply “could be catastrophic… in a very, very short period of time.”

The winning energy mix is “yes, and,” not a single-resource bet. Erin’s personal bet is that solar and batteries will remain cheap and fast, but she says gas, nuclear, geothermal and hydro will remain necessary because the long-tail cost of intermittency becomes severe once variable resources reach roughly 50%-75% of the grid. Her broader point is about load design: expanding data centers, EVs, heat pumps and autonomy will enlarge both baseload and daily peaks, so the system must not oversolve for either.

Flexible compute is a more plausible demand-response asset than centrally controlling Americans’ thermostats. David says consumers will “flatly reject” dictated indoor temperatures, while Erik points to crypto mining and David suggests shifting noncritical data-center jobs to cheaper hours. David also pushes back on Erin’s view that data-center demand may be overstated, arguing society may instead be underestimating AI electricity consumption across the next 10-50 years.

Grid software is the clearest venture-scale layer in an otherwise capital-heavy rebuild. Erin explains that the grid lacks the internet’s bidirectional communication, data layer and control plane; David argues that software should enter from the edges rather than through a slow top-down utility rollout. The grid lacks “no Splunk,” “no Palo Alto Networks” and “no Looker,” while bottom-up telemetry from batteries, chargers and distributed generation could improve forecasting that still relies heavily on weather. Erin says AI could also turn permitting work performed by armies of consultants over months or years into “minutes or hours.”

Nuclear combines baseload, resilience and defense value, but scaling it requires rebuilding America’s megaproject muscle. David highlights Radiant Nuclear’s proposed 1-megawatt, truck-transportable microreactor and separately imagines transportable reactors being flown on C-130s. He contrasts that flexibility with military fuel that can cost more than $200—and sometimes $400—per gallon to deliver. The closing priorities are categorical: Ryan says there is no safety, national defense or national security without a reliable electrical grid; Erik says energy policy should prioritize power that is “cheap, reliable and clean—in that order.”

🔗 Original source & video: America’s Energy Problem: We Need A New Grid